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Abstract
Differentially private GANs have proven to be a promising approach for generating
realistic synthetic data without compromising the privacy of individuals. However,
due to the privacy-protective noise introduced in the training, the convergence
of GANs becomes even more elusive, which often leads to poor utility in the
output generator at the end of training. We propose Private post-GAN boosting
(Private PGB), a differentially private method that combines samples produced by
the sequence of generators obtained during GAN training to create a high-quality
synthetic dataset. Our method leverages the Private Multiplicative Weights method
(Hardt and Rothblum, 2010) and the discriminator rejection sampling technique
(Azadi et al., 2019) for reweighting generated samples, to obtain high quality
synthetic data even in cases where GAN training does not converge. We evaluate
Private PGB on a Gaussian mixture dataset and two US Census datasets, and
demonstrate that Private PGB improves upon the standard private GAN approach
across a collection of quality measures. Finally, we provide a non-private variant
of PGB that improves the data quality of standard GAN training.
1 Introduction
The vast collection of detailed personal data, including everything from medical history to voting
records, to GPS traces, to online behavior, promises to enable researchers from many disciplines
to conduct insightful data analyses. However, many of these datasets contain sensitive personal
information, and there is a growing tension between data analyses and data privacy. To protect the
privacy of individual citizens, many organizations, including Google [15], Microsoft [13], Apple [12],
and more recently the 2020 US Census [2], have adopted differential privacy [14] as a mathematically
rigorous privacy measure. However, working with noisy statistics released under differential privacy
requires training.
A natural and promising approach to tackle this challenge is to release differentially private synthetic
data—a privatized version of the dataset that consists of fake data records and that approximates
the real dataset on important statistical properties of interest. Since they already satisfy differential
privacy, synthetic data enable researchers to interact with the data freely and to perform the same
analyses even without expertise in differential privacy. A recent line of work [8, 36, 37] studies how
one can generate synthetic data by incorporating differential privacy into generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [18]. Although GANs provide a powerful framework for synthetic data, they are
also notoriously hard to train and privacy constraint imposes even more difficulty. Due to the added
noise in the private gradient updates, it is often difficult to reach convergence with private training.
In this paper, we study how to improve the quality of the synthetic data produced by private GANs.
Unlike much of the prior work that focuses on fine-tuning of network architectures and training
techniques, we propose Private post-GAN boosting (Private PGB)—a differentially private method
that boosts the quality of the generated samples after the training of a GAN. Our method can be
viewed as a simple and practical amplification scheme that improves the distribution from any existing
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black-box GAN training method – private or not. We take inspiration from an empirical observation
in [8] that even though the generator distribution at the end of the private training may be a poor
approximation to the data distribution (due to e.g. mode collapse), there may exist a high-quality
mixture distribution that is given by several generators over different training epochs. PGB is a
principled method for finding such a mixture at a moderate privacy cost and without any modification
of the GAN training procedure.
To derive PGB, we first formulate a two-player zero-sum game, called post-GAN zero-sum game,
between a synthetic data player, who chooses a distribution over generated samples over training
epochs to emulate the real dataset, and a distinguisher player, who tries to distinguish generated
samples from real samples with the set of discriminators over training epochs. We show that under a
“support coverage” assumption the synthetic data player’s mixed strategy (given by a distribution over
the generated samples) at an equilibrium can successfully “fool” the distinguisher–that is, no mixture
of discriminators can distinguish the real versus fake examples better than random guessing. While
the strict assumption does not always hold in practice, we demonstrate empirically that the synthetic
data player’s equilibrium mixture consistently improves the GAN distribution.
The Private PGB method then privately computes an approximate equilibrium in the game. The
algorithm can be viewed as a computationally efficient variant of MWEM (private multiplicative
weights with exponential mechanism) [20, 19], which is an inefficient query release algorithm with
near-optimal sample complexity. Since MWEM maintains a distribution over exponentially many
“experts” (the set of all possible records in the data domain), it runs in time exponential in the
dimension of the data. In contrast, we rely on private GAN to reduce the support to only contain the
set of privately generated samples, which makes PGB tractable even for high-dimensional data.
We also provide an extension of the PGB method by incorporating the technique of discriminator
rejection sampling [7, 35]. We leverage the fact that the distinguisher’s equilibrium strategy, which
is a mixture of discriminators, can often accurately predict which samples are unlikely and thus
can be used as a rejection sampler. This allows us to further improve the PGB distribution with
rejection sampling without any additional privacy cost since differential privacy is preserved under
post-processing. Our Private PGB method also has a natural non-private variant, which we show
improves the GAN training without privacy constraints.
We empirically evaluate both the Private and Non-Private PGB methods on three tasks. To visualize
the effects of our methods, we first evaluate our methods on a two-dimensional synthetic dataset that
consists of samples drawn from a mixture of 25 Gaussian distributions. We define a relevant quality
score function and show that the both Private and Non-Private PGB methods improve the score of the
samples generated from GAN. We then focus on two US Census datasets and demonstrate that the
PGB method can improve the generator distribution on several statistical measures, including 3-way
marginal distributions and pMSE. Finally, we evaluate the PGB methods on a machine learning task
with a natural classification task. We train predictive models on samples from PGB and sample
from GAN (without PGB), and show that the models trained on synthetic data generated with PGB
consistently have higher accuracy on real out-of-sample test data.
Related work. Our PGB method can be viewed as a modular boosting method that can improve
on a growing line of work on differentially private GANs [8, 36, 17, 34]. To obtain formal privacy
guarantees, these algorithms optimize the discriminators in GAN under differential privacy, by using
private SGD, RMSprop, or Adam methods, and track the privacy cost using moments accounting
[1, 27]. [37] give a private GAN training method by adapting ideas from the PATE framework [28].
Our PGB method is inspired by the Private Multiplicative Weigths method [20] and its more practical
variant MWEM [19], which answer a large collection of statistical queries by releasing a synthetic
dataset. Our work also draws upon two recent techniques ([35] and [7]) that use the discriminator
as a rejection sampler to improve the generator distribution. We apply their technique by using the
mixture discriminator computed in PGB as the rejection sampler. There has also been work that
applies the idea of boosting to (non-private) GANs. For example, [5] and [21] propose methods that
directly train a mixture of generators and discriminators, and [33] proposes AdaGAN that reweighes
the real examples during training similarly to what is done in AdaBoost [16]. Both of these methods
may be hard to make differentially private: they either require substantially more privacy budget to
train a collection of discriminators or increase the weights on a subset of examples, which requires
more adding more noise when computing private gradients. In contrast, our PGB method boosts the
generated samples post training and does not make modifications to the GAN training procedure.
2
2 Preliminaries
Let X denote the data domain of all possible observations in a given context. Let pd be a distribution
over X . We say that two datasets X,X ′ ∈ Xn are adjacent, denoted by X ∼ X ′, if they differ by at
most one observation. We will write pX to denote the empirical distribution over X .
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (DP) [14]). A randomized algorithm A : Xn → R with output
domainR (e.g. all generative models) is (ε, δ)-differentially private (DP) if for all adjacent datasets
X,X ′ ∈ Xn and for all S ⊆ R: P (A(X) ∈ S) ≤ eεP (A(X ′) ∈ S) + δ.
A very nice property of differential privacy is that it is preserved under post-processing.
Lemma 1 (Post-processing). LetM be an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm with output range
R and f : R→ R′ be any mapping, the composition f ◦M is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
As a result, any subsequent analyses conducted on differentially private synthetic data also satisfy DP.
The exponential mechanism [26] is a private mechanism for selecting among the best of a discrete
set of alternativesR, where “best” is defined by a quality function q : Xn ×R → R that measures
the quality of the result r for the dataset X . The sensitivity of the quality score q is defined as
∆(q) = maxr∈RmaxX∼X′ |q(X, r)−q(X ′, r)|. Then given a quality score q and privacy parameter
ε, the exponential mechanismME(q, ε,X) simply samples a random alternative from the rangeR
such that the probability of selecting each r is proportional to exp(εq(X, r)/(2∆(q))).
2.1 Differentially Private GAN
The framework of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [18] consists of two types of neural
networks: generators and discriminators. A generator G is a function that maps random vectors
z ∈ Z drawn from a prior distribution pz to a sample G(z) ∈ X . A discriminator D takes an
observation x ∈ X as input and computes a probability D(x) that the observation is real. Each
observation is either drawn from the underlying distribution pd or the induced distribution pg
from a generator. The training of GAN involves solving the following joint optimization over the
discriminator and generator:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pX [f(D(x))] + Ez∼pz [f(1−D(G(z)))]
where f : [0, 1]→ R is a monotone function. For example, in standard GAN, f(a) = log a, and in
Wasserstein GAN [3], f(a) = a. The standard (non-private) algorithm iterates between optimizing
the parameters of the discriminator and the generator based on the loss functions:
LD = −Ex∼pX [f(D(x))]− Ez∼pz [f(1−D(G(z)))], LG = Ez∼pz [f(1−D(G(z)))]
The private algorithm for training GAN also performs the same alternating optimization, but it
optimizes the discriminator under differential privacy while keeping the generator optimization the
same. In general, the training proceeds over epochs τ = 1, . . . , N , and at the end of each epoch
τ the algorithm obtains a discriminator Dτ and a generator Gτ by optimizing the loss functions
respectively. In [8, 36], the private optimization on the discriminators is done by running the private
SGD method [1] or its variants. [37] performs the private optimization by incorporating the PATE
framework [28]. For all of these private GAN methods, the entire sequence of discriminators
{D1, . . . , DN} satisfies privacy, and thus the sequence of generators {G1, . . . , GN} is also private
since they can be viewed as post-processing of the discriminators. Our PGB method is agnostic to
the exact private GAN training methods.
3 Private Post-GAN Boosting
The noisy gradient updates impede convergence of the differentially private GAN training algorithm,
and the generator obtained in the final epoch of the training procedure may not yield a good ap-
proximation to the data distribution. Nonetheless, empirical evidence has shown that a mixture over
the set of generators can be a realistic distribution [8]. We now provide a principled and practical
scheme for computing such a mixture subject to a moderate privacy budget. Recall that during private
GAN training method produces a sequence of generators G = {G1, . . . , GN} and discriminators
D = {D1, . . . , DN}. Our boosting method computes a weighted mixture of the Gj’s and a weighted
mixture of the Dj’s that improve upon any individual generator and discriminator. We do that by
computing an equilibrium of the following post-GAN (training) zero-sum game.
3
3.1 Post-GAN Zero-Sum Game.
We will first draw r independent samples from each generator Gj , and let B be the collection of the
rN examples drawn from the set of generators. Consider the following post-GAN zero-sum game
between a synthetic data player, who maintains a distribution φ over the data in B to imitate the
true data distribution pX , and a distinguisher player, who uses a mixture of discriminators to tell
the two distributions φ and pX apart. This zero-sum game is aligned with the minimax game in the
original GAN formulation, but is much more tractable since each player has a finite set of strategies.
To define the payoff in the game, we will adapt from the Wasserstein GAN objective since it is less
sensitive than the standard GAN objective to the change of any single observation (changing any
single real example changes the payoff by at most 1/n), rendering it more compatible with privacy
tools. Formally, for any x ∈ B and any discriminator Dj , define the payoff as
U(x,Dj) = Ex′∼pX [Dj(x′)] + (1−Dj(x))
For any distribution φ over B, let U(φ, ·) = Ex∼φ[U(x, ·)], and similarly for any distribution ψ
over {D1, . . . , DN}, we will write U(·, ψ) = ED∼ψ[U(·, D)]. Intuitively, the payoff function U
measures the predictive accuracy of the distinguisher in classifying whether the examples are drawn
from the synthetic data player’s distribution φ or the private dataset X . Thus, the synthetic data
player aims to minimize U while the distinguisher player aims to maximize U .
Definition 2. The pair (D,φ) is an α-approximate equilibrium of the post-GAN game if
max
Dj∈D
U(φ,Dj) ≤ U(φ,D) + α, and min
φ∈∆(B)
U(φ,D) ≥ U(φ,D)− α (1)
By von Neumann’s minimax theorem, there exists a value V – called the game value – such that
V = min
φ∈∆(B)
max
j∈[N ]
U(φ,Dj) = max
ψ∈∆(D)
min
x∈B
U(x, ψ)
The game value corresponds to the payoff value at an exact equilibrium of the game (that is α = 0).
When the set of discriminators cannot predict the real versus fake examples better than random
guessing, the game value V = 1. We now show that under the assumption that the generated samples
in B approximately cover the support of the dataset X , the distinguisher player cannot distinguish
the real and fake distributions much better than by random guessing.
Theorem 1. Fix a private dataset X ∈ (Rd)n. Suppose that for every x ∈ X , there exists xb ∈ B
such that ‖x− xb‖2 ≤ γ. Suppose D includes a discriminator network D1/2 that outputs 1/2 for all
inputs, and assume that all networks in D are L-Lipschitz. Then there exists a distribution φ ∈ ∆(B)
such that (φ,D1/2) is a Lγ-approximate equilibrium, and so 1 ≤ V ≤ 1 + Lγ.
We defer the proof to the appendix. While the support coverage assumption is strong, we show
empirically the synthetic data player’s mixture distribution in an approximate equilibrium improves
on the distribution given by the last generator GN even when the assumption does not hold. We now
provide a method for computing an approximate equilibrium of the game.
3.2 Boosting via Equilibrium Computation.
Our post-GAN boosting (PGB) method computes an approximate equilibrium of the post-GAN
zero-sum game by simulating the so-called no-regret dynamics. Over T rounds the synthetic data
player maintains a sequence of distributions φ1, . . . , φT over the set B, and the distinguisher plays a
sequence of discriminatorsD1, . . . , DT . At each round t, the distinguisher first selects a discriminator
D using the exponential mechanismME with the payoff U(φt, ·) as the score function. This will
find an accurate discriminator Dt against the current synthetic distribution φt, so that the synthetic
data player can improve the distribution. Then the synthetic data player updates its distribution to
φt based on an online no-regret learning algorithm–the multiplicative weights (MW) method [23].
We can view the set of generated examples in B as a set of “experts”, and the algorithm maintains a
distribution over these experts and, over time, places more weight on the examples that can better
“fool” the distinguisher player. To do so, MW updates the weight for each x ∈ B with
φt+1(x) ∝ φt exp (−ηU(x,Dt)) ∝ exp (ηDt(x)) (2)
where η is the learning rate. At the end, the algorithm outputs the average plays (D,φ) for both
players. We will show these form an approximate equilibrium of the post-GAN zero-sum game [16].
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Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Post-GAN Boosting
Require: a private dataset X ∈ Xn, a synthetic dataset B generated by the set of generators G, a
collection of discriminators {D1, . . . , DN}, number of iterations T , per-round privacy budget 0,
learning rate parameter η.
Initialize φ1 to be the uniform distribution over B
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Distinguisher player: Run exponential mechanism ME to select a discriminator Dt using
quality score q(X,Dj) = U(φt, Dj) and privacy parameter 0.
Synthetic data player: Multiplicative weights update on the distribution over B: for each
example b ∈ B:
φt+1(b) ∝ φt(b) exp(ηDt(b))
Let D be the discriminator defined by the uniform average over the set {D1, . . . , DT }, and φ be
the distribution defined by the average over the set {φ1, . . . , φT }
Note that the synthetic data player’s MW update rule does not involve the private dataset, and hence
is just a post-processing step of the selected discriminator Dt. Thus, the privacy guarantee follows
from the composition of T runs of the exponential mechanism (proof in the appendix).
Theorem 2 (Privacy Guarantee). For any δ ∈ (0, 1), the private MW post-amplification algorithm
satisfies (, δ)-DP with  =
√
2 log(1/δ)T0 + T0(exp(0)− 1).
Note that if the private GAN training algorithm satisfies (ε1, δ1)-DP and the Private PGB method
satisfies (ε2, δ2)-DP, then the entire procedure is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-DP.
We now show that the pair of average plays form an approximate equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 3 (Approximate Equilibrium). With probability 1−β, the pair (D,φ) is an α-approximate
equilibrium of the post-GAN zero-sum game with α = 4η + log |B|ηT +
2 log(NT/β)
nε0
. If T ≥ n2 and
η = 12
√
log(|B|)/T , then
α = O
(
log(nN |B|/β)
nε0
)
We provide a proof sketch here and defer the full proof to the appendix. By the result of [16], if the two
players have low regret in the dynamics, then their average plays form an approximate equilibrium,
where the regret of the two players is defined as Rsyn =
∑T
t=1 U(φ
t, Dt)−minb∈B
∑T
t=1 U(b,D
t)
and Rdis = maxDj
∑T
t=1 U(φ
t, Dj)−
∑T
t=1 U(φ
t, Dt). Then approximate equilibrium guarantee
directly follows from bounding Rsyn with the regret bound of MW and Rdis with the approximate
optimality of the exponential mechanism.
Non-Private PGB. The Private PGB method has a natural non-private variant: in each round,
instead of drawing from the exponential mechanism, the distinguisher player will simply compute the
exact best response: Dt = arg maxDj U(φ
t, Dj). Then if we set learning rate η = 12
√
log(|B|)/T
and run for T = log(|B|)/α2 rounds, the pair (D,φ) returned is an α-approximate equilibrium.
Extension with Discriminator Rejection Sampling. The mixture discriminator D at the equilib-
rium provides an accurate predictor on which samples are unlikely. As a result, we can use D to
further improve the data distribution φ by the discriminator rejection sampling (DRS) technique of [7].
The DRS scheme in our setting generates a single example as follows: first draw an example x from
φ (the proposal distribution), and then accept x with probability proportional to D(x)/(1−D(x)).
Note that the optimal discriminator D∗ that distinguishes the distribution φ from true data distribution
pd will accept x with probability proportional to pd(x)/pφ(x) = D
∗(x)/(1−D∗(x)). Our scheme
aims to approximate this ideal rejection sampling by approxinating D∗ with the equilibrium strategy
D, whereas prior work uses the last discriminator DN as an approximation.
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4 Empirical Evaluation
We empirically evaluate how both the Private and Non-Private PGB methods affect the utility of
the generated synthetic data from GANs. We show two appealing advantages of our approach:
1) non-private PGB outperforms other GAN post-processing methods, and 2) our approach can
significantly improve the synthetic examples generated by a GAN under differential privacy.
Datasets. We assess our method with a toy dataset drawn from a mixture of 25 Gaussians, which is
commonly used to evaluate the quality of GAN [31, 7, 35]. We then synthesize real datasets from the
American Census, and a stanard machine learning dataset (Titanic).
Privacy budget. We set the privacy budget to be the same across all algorithms. Since Private PGB
requires additional privacy budget this means that the DP GAN training has to be stopped earlier
as compared to running only DP GAN to achieve the same privacy guarantee. Our principle is to
allocate the majority of the privacy budget to the DP GAN training, and a much smaller budget for
our Private PGB method. Throughout we used 80% of the final privacy budget on DP GAN training.1
Utility measures. Utility of synthetic data can be assessed along two dimensions; general utility and
specific utility [30, 4]. General utility describes the overall distributional similarity between the real
data and synthetic datasets, but does not capture specific use cases of synthetic data. To assess general
utility, we use the propensity score mean squared error (pMSE) measure [30].2 Specific utility of a
synthetic dataset depends on the specific use an analyst has in mind. In general, specific utility can be
defined as the similarity of results for analyses using synthetic data instead of real data. For each of
the experiments we define specific utility measures that are sensible for the respective example. For
the toy dataset of 25 gaussians we look at the number of high quality samples. For the American
Census data we compare marginal distributions of the synthetic data to marginal distributions of the
true data and look at the similarity of regression results.
4.1 Mixture of 25 Gaussians
We first examine the performance of our approach on a two dimensional dataset with a mixture of
25 multivariate Gaussian distributions, each with a covariance matrix of 0.0025I . The left column
in Figure 1 displays the training data. Each of the 25 clusters consists of 1, 000 observations. The
architecture of the GAN is the same across all results. 3 To compare the utility of the synthetic
datasets with the real data, we inspect the visual quality of the results, calculate the pMSE ratio
score,4 and calculate the proportion of high quality synthetic examples similar to [7, 35, 31]5. In the
real data, given the data generating process outlined above, at each mode 90% of the observations
lie within a circle with radius r =
√
0.0025 · 4.60517 around the mode centroids, with 4.60517, the
critical value at p = 0.9 of a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and 0.0025 the variance of the
spherical gaussian. To calculate the quality score we count the number of observations within each
of these 25 circles. If one of the modes contains more points than we would expect given the true
distribution the count is capped accordingly. Our quality score for the toy dataset of 25 gaussians can
be expressed as Q =
∑25
i (min(p
i
real ·Nsyn, N isyn)/Nsyn), where i indexes the clusters, preal is the
true distribution of points per cluster, N isyn the number of observations at a cluster within radius r,
and Nsyn the total number of synthetic examples.
1Our observation is that the DP GAN training is doing the “heavy lifting”. Providing a good “basis” for PGB
requires a substantial privacy expenditure in training DP GAN. The privacy budget allocation is a hyperparameter
for PGB that could be tuned. In general, the problem of differentially private hyperparameter selection is
extremely important and the literature is thin [24, 10].
2To calculate the pMSE one trains a discriminator to distinguish between real and synthetic examples. The
predicted probability of being classified as real or synthetic is the propensity score. Taking all propensity scores
into account the mean squared error between the propensity scores and the proportion of real data examples is
calculated. A synthetic dataset has high general utility, if the model can at best predict probabilities of 0.5 for
both real and synthetic examples, then the pMSE would be 0.
3A description of the architecture is in the appendix. The code for the GANs and the PGB can be found on
https://github.com/mneunhoe/post-gan-boosting.
4The pMSE ratio score is the ratio of the pMSE score to its null expectation [30] For perfect synthesis we
would expect a pMSE ratio score of 1. Higher values indicate lower general utility.
5Note that the scores in [7] and [35] do not account for the synthetic data distribution across the 25 modes.
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Results without differential privacy. Visual inspection of the results without differential privacy
(the top row in Figure 1) shows that our proposed method outperforms the synthetic examples
generated by the last Generator of the GAN as well as the last Generator enhanced by DRS. PGB over
the last 200 stored Generators and Discriminators trained for T = 400 update steps, visibly improves
the results. Taking the distribution of synthetic examples after PGB and using it as the proposal
distribution for DRS seems to improve the results further. The visual impression is confirmed both by
the pMSE values as well as the proportion of high quality samples in Table 1. The combination of
PGB and DRS achieves the best pMSE as well as the highest proportion of high quality samples.
Figure 1: Real samples from 25 multivariate normal distributions (left column), synthetic examples
without privacy from a GAN and three post-processing methods (top row) and synthetic examples
from a GAN with differential privacy and the respective differentially private post processing methods
(bottom row).
Results with differential privacy. We then run the experiment with DP.6 Our final value of  is 1
and δ is 12N = 0.00002. For the results with PGB, DP GAN training contributes 0.8 to the overall
epsilon and the Private PGB algorithm 0.2. Again a first visual inspection of the results in the bottom
row of Figure 1 shows that post-processing the results of the last GAN Generator is worthwhile.
PGB over the last 200 stored Generators and Discriminators trained for T = 400 update steps, again,
visibly improves the results. Combining PGB with DRS further improves the quality of the samples.
Our visual impression is confirmed by the general utility pMSE Ratio scores, and the proportion of
high quality samples displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Quality of Synthetic Data for the toy dataset of 25 Gaussians. Without differential privacy
and with differential privacy ( = 1, δ = 0.00002).
GAN DRS PGB PGB
+DRS
pMSE Ratio 11.221 10.856 9.780 6.862
pMSE Ratio DP 12.488 13.026 10.745 10.952
Quality 0.055 0.147 0.164 0.252
Quality DP 0.008 0.019 0.032 0.035
4.2 American Census Data
The results on the toy dataset of 25 gaussians are encouraging. However, the ultimate goal of private
synthetic data is to protect the privacy of actual persons in data collections, and to provide useful
data to interested analysts. In this section we report the results of synthesizing data from the 1940
American Census. We rely on the public use micro data samples (PUMS) as provided in [29].7
6To achieve DP, we trained the Discriminator with the DP Adam optimizer as implemented in
tensorflow_privacy. We keep track of the values of  and δ by using the moments accountant [1, 27].
7More experiments using data from the 2010 American Census can be found in the appendix.
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Private Synthetic 1940 American Census Samples. For 1940 we synthesize an excerpt of the 1%
sample of all Californians that were at least 18 years old.8 Our training sample consists of 39,660
observations and 8 attributes (sex, age, educational attainment, income, race, Hispanic origin, marital
status and county). The test set contains another 9,915 observations. The GAN networks consist of
two fully connected hidden layers (256, 128) with Leaky ReLu activation functions. To sample from
categorical attributes we apply the Gumbel-Softmax trick [25, 22] to the output layer of the Generator.
We run our PGB algorithm over the last 150 stored Generators and Discriminators and train it for
T = 400 update steps. Our final value of  is 1 and δ is 12N ≈ 1.26× 10−5 (after DP GAN training
with  = 0.8 and PGB  = 0.2). The general utility scores as measured by the pMSE ratio score are
2.357 (DP GAN), 2.313 (DP DRS), 2.253 (DP PGB), and 2.445 (DP PGB+DRS). This indicates that
PGB achieves the best general utility. To assess the specific utility of our synthetic census samples
we compare one-way marginal distributions to the same marginal distributions in the original data. In
panel (A) of Figure 2 we show the distribution of race membership. Comparing the synthetic data
distributions to the true distribution, we can conclude that PGB, as well as PGB+DRS, improves
upon the last Generator as well as DRS. To underpin the visual impression we calculate the total
variation distance between each of the synthetic distributions and the real distribution, the data from
DP GAN has a total variation distance of 0.58, DP DRS of 0.44, DP PGB of 0.22 and DP PGB+DRS
of 0.13. Furthermore, we evaluate whether more complex analysis models, such as regression models,
trained on synthetic samples could be used to make sensible out-of-sample predictions. Panel (B) of
Figure 2 shows that the out-of-sample root mean squared error of predicted income is lower for all
linear regression models trained with three independent variables from the set of on the synthetic
data generated with Private PGB as compared to DP GAN and DP DRS.
Figure 2: Specific Utility of Synthetic 1940 American Census Data. Panel (A): Distribution of Race
Membership in Synthetic Samples. Panel (B): Regression RMSE with Synthetic Samples.
4.3 Machine Learning Prediction with Synthetic Data
In a final set of experiments we evaluate the performance of machine learning models trained on
synthetic data (with and without privacy) and tested on real out-of-sample data. We synthesize the
Kaggle Titanic9 training set (891 observations of Titanic passengers on 8 attributes) and train three
machine learning models (Logistic Regression, Random Forests (RF) [9] and XGBoost [11]) on the
synthetic datasets to predict whether someone survived the Titanic catastrophe. We then evaluate the
performance on the test set with 418 observations. To address missing values in both the training set
and the test set we independently impute values using the MissForest [32] algorithm. For the private
synthetic data our final value of  is 2 and δ is 12N ≈ 5.6 × 10−4 (for PGB this implies DP GAN
training with  = 1.6 and PGB  = 0.4). The models trained on synthetic data generated with our
approaches (PGB and PGB+DRS) consistently perform better than models trained on synthetic data
from the last generator or DRS – with or without privacy.10
8A 1% sample means that the micro data contains 1% of the total American (here Californian) population.
9https://www.kaggle.com/c/titanic/data
10Table 2 in the appendix summarizes the results in more detail. We present the accuracy, ROC AUC and PR
AUC to evaluate the performance.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that if the synthetic data player plays the distribution over X , then
U(pX , D) = Ex∼pX [D(x′)] + Ex∼φ[1 − D(x)] = 1 for any discriminator D ∈ D. Now let
us replace each element in X with its γ-approximation in B and obtain a new dataset XB , and
let pXB denote the empirical distribution over XB . By the Lipschitz conditions, we then have|U(pX , D)− U(pXB , D)| ≤ Lγ. This means U(pXB , D) ∈ [1− Lγ, 1 + Lγ] for all D. Also, for
all φ ∈ ∆(B), we have U(φ,D1/2) = 1. Thus, (pXb , D1/2) satisfies (1) with α = Lγ.
A.2 Proof of the Approximate Equilibrium
Proof. We will use the seminal result of [16], which shows that if the two players have low regret
in the dynamics, then their average plays form an approximate equilibrium. First, we will bound
the regret from the data player. The regret guarantee of the multiplicative weights algorithm (see
e.g. Theorem 2.3 of [6]) gives
T∑
t=1
U(φt, Dt)−min
b∈B
T∑
t=1
U(b,Dt) ≤ 4ηT + log |B|
η
(3)
Next, we bound the regret of the distinguisher using the accuracy guarantee of the exponential
mechanism [26]. For each t, we know with probability (1− β/T ),
max
Dj
U(φt, Dj)− U(φt, Dt) ≤ 2 log(NT/β)
nε0
Taking a union bound, we have this accuracy guarantee holds for all t, and so
max
Dj
T∑
t=1
U(φt, Dj)−
T∑
t=1
U(φt, Dt) ≤ 2T log(NT/β)
nε0
(4)
Then following the result of [16], their average plays (D,φ) is an α-approximate equilibrium with
α = 4η +
log |B|
ηT
+
2 log(NT/β)
nε0
Plugging in the choices of T and η gives the stated bound.
A.3 GAN Architecture for the Mixture of 25 Gaussians experiment
The generator and discriminator are neural nets with three fully connected hidden layers with Leaky
ReLu activations. We add dropout layers to the generator net with a dropout rate of 50%. The latent
noise vector Z is of dimension 32 and independently sampled from a gaussian distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation of 1.
A.4 Private Synthetic 2010 American Decennial Census Samples.
The 2010 data is similar to the data that the American Census will collect for the 2020 decennial
Census. For this experiment, we synthesize a 10% sample for California with 3,723,669 observations
of 5 attributes (gender, age, Hispanic origin, race and puma district membership). Our final value of
 is 0.795 and δ is 12N ≈ 1.34× 10−7 (for PGB the GAN training contributes  = 0.786 and PGB
 = 0.09). The pMSE ratio scores are 1.934 (DP GAN), 1.889 (DP DRS), 1.609 (DP PGB) and
1.485 (DP PGB+DRS), here PGB achieves the best general utility. For specific utility, we compare
the accuracy of three-way marginals on the synthetic data to the proportions in the true data.11 We
tabulate race (11 answer categories in the 2010 Census) by Hispanic origin (25 answer categories in
the 2010 Census) by gender (2 answer categories in the 2010 Census) giving us a total of 550 cells.
11A task that is similar to the tables released by the Census.
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To assess the specific utility for these three-way marginals we calculate the average accuracy across
all 550 cells. Compared to the true data DP GAN achieves 99.82%, DP DRS 99.89%, DP PGB
99.89% and the combination of DP PGB and DRS 99.93%. Besides the average accuracy across all
550 cells another interesting metric of specific utility is the number of cells in which each synthesizer
achieves the highest accuracy compared to the other methods, this is the case 43 times for DP GAN,
30 times for DP DRS, 90 times for DP PGB and 387 times for DP PGB+DRS. Again, this shows that
our proposed approach can improve the utility of private synthetic data.
A.5 Detailed Results of Machine Learning Prediction with Synthetic Data
Table 2 summarizes the results for the machine learning prediction experiment with the Titanic data.
We present the accuracy, ROC AUC and PR AUC to evaluate the performance. It can be seen that
the models trained on synthetic data generated with our approach consistently perform better than
models trained on synthetic data from the last generator or DRS – with or without privacy. To put
these values into perspective, the models trained on the real training data and tested on the same
out-of-sample data achieve the scores in table 3.
Table 2: Predicting Titanic Survivors with Machine Learning Models trained on synthetic data and
tested on real out-of-sample data. Median scores of 20 repetitions with independently generated
synthetic data. With differential privacy  is 2 and δ is 12N ≈ 5.6× 10−4.
GAN DRS PGB PGB
+ DRS
Logit Accuracy 0.626 0.746 0.701 0.765
Logit ROC AUC 0.591 0.760 0.726 0.792
Logit PR AUC 0.483 0.686 0.655 0.748
RF Accuracy 0.594 0.724 0.719 0.742
RF ROC AUC 0.531 0.744 0.741 0.771
RF PR AUC 0.425 0.701 0.706 0.743
XGBoost Accuracy 0.547 0.724 0.683 0.740
XGBoost ROC AUC 0.503 0.732 0.681 0.772
XGBoost PR AUC 0.400 0.689 0.611 0.732
DP DP DP DP PGB
GAN DRS PGB +DRS
Logit Accuracy 0.566 0.577 0.640 0.649
Logit ROC AUC 0.477 0.568 0.621 0.624
Logit PR AUC 0.407 0.482 0.532 0.547
RF Accuracy 0.487 0.459 0.481 0.628
RF ROC AUC ROC AUC 0.512 0.553 0.558 0.652
RF PR AUC PR AUC 0.407 0.442 0.425 0.535
XGBoost Accuracy 0.577 0.589 0.609 0.641
XGBoost ROC AUC 0.530 0.586 0.619 0.596
XGBoost PR AUC 0.398 0.479 0.488 0.526
A.6 Results with the same GANs across all methods
To compare our method against other we produced synthetic data that has the same privacy guarantees
across all methods. To achieve this we trained the DP GAN for additional update steps. This means,
however, that it is difficult to see how much Post-GAN Boosting improves upon the last Generator
that was used in PGB. Therefore, a second possibility to assess the contribution of our proposed
Post-GAN Boosting approach is to take the same sequence of generators and discriminators across
all the results. For these results DP PGB uses an additional privacy budget compared to DP GAN
or DP DRS. The following results together with the results in the main part of the paper show that
spending more privacy budget on the GAN training does not improve the sample quality by as much
as if the same privacy budget was spent on our PGB methods.
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Table 3: Predicting Titanic Survivors with Machine Learning Models trained on real data and tested
on real out-of-sample data.
Model Score
Logit Accuracy 0.764
Logit ROC AUC 0.813
Logit PR AUC 0.785
RF Accuracy 0.768
RF ROC AUC 0.809
RF PR AUC 0.767
XGBoost Accuracy 0.768
XGBoost ROC AUC 0.773
XGBoost PR AUC 0.718
Table 4: Quality of Synthetic Data for the toy dataset of 25 Gaussians. Without differential privacy and
with differential privacy where DP GAN and DP DRS satisfy ( = 0.635, δ = 0.00002) differential
privacy and DP PGB and DP PGB+DRS ( = 1, δ = 0.00002) differential privacy.
GAN DRS PGB PGB
+DRS
pMSE Ratio DP 3.019 3.124 2.694 2.671
Quality DP 0.009 0.010 0.058 0.072
Mixture of 25 Gaussians. In figure 3 we display the synthetic data that used the same sequence of
generators and discriminators across all results. The corresponding quality scores can be found in
table 4.
Figure 3: Real samples from 25 multivariate normal distributions (left column), synthetic examples
without privacy from a GAN and three post-processing methods (top row) and synthetic examples
from a GAN with differential privacy and the respective differentially private post processing methods
(bottom row).
Private Synthetic 1940 American Census Samples. Our final value of  is 1 and δ is 12N ≈
1.26×10−5 for DP PGB and DP PGB+DRS (after GAN training with  = 0.799 and PGB  = 0.201).
The results for DP GAN and DP DRS satisfy  = 0.799 and δ = 12N ≈ 1.26× 10−5.
For this setup, the general utility scores as measured by the pMSE ratio score are 7.109 (DP GAN),
7.898 (DP DRS), 6.353 (DP PGB), and 5.214 (DP PGB+DRS). Figure 4 displays the distribution
of race membership and figure 5 shows that the out-of-sample root mean squared error of predicted
income is lower for all linear regression models trained with three independent variables from the set
of on the synthetic data generated with Private PGB as compared to DP GAN and DP DRS.
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Figure 4: The distribution of races in private synthetic 1940 census data.
Figure 5: Private synthetic 1940 census data. Comparison of regression out-of-sample prediction
root mean squared errors of income for all combinations of linear regression with three independent
variables from the attributes sex, age, educational attainment, race and marital status.
Machine Learning Prediction with Synthetic Data. For the private synthetic data our final value
of  is 2 and δ is 12N ≈ 5.6× 10−4 (after GAN training with  = 1.547 and PGB  = 0.453). Thus,
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DP GAN and DP DRS are  = 1.547, δ = 5.6× 10−4) differentially private. Table 5 summarizes
the results. As before, we present the accuracy, ROC AUC and PR AUC to evaluate the performance.
It can be seen that the models trained on synthetic data generated with our approaches (PGB and
PGB+DRS) consistently perform better than models trained on synthetic data from the last generator
or DRS – with or without privacy.
Table 5: Predicting Titanic Survivors with Machine Learning Models trained on differentially private
synthetic data and tested on real out-of-sample data. The  for DP GAN and DP DRS is 1.547, and 2
for DP PGB and DP PGB+DRS. Median scores of 25 repetitions of independently generated synthetic
data.
DP DP DP DP PGB
GAN DRS PGB +DRS
Logit Accuracy 0.537 0.606 0.583 0.615
Logit ROC AUC 0.487 0.604 0.631 0.570
Logit PR AUC 0.411 0.483 0.538 0.467
RF Accuracy 0.495 0.621 0.591 0.628
RF ROC AUC 0.467 0.644 0.628 0.682
RF PR AUC 0.389 0.509 0.517 0.549
XGBoost Accuracy 0.520 0.591 0.596 0.639
XGBoost ROC AUC 0.529 0.643 0.620 0.626
XGBoost PR AUC 0.410 0.508 0.509 0.568
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